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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Alfred Brown Company seeks affirmance of the judg.
ment below.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The parties are referred to as they appeared in the
court below. All italics in this brief have been added.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant in his brief has failed to state clearly
and completely the undisputed facts.
This action for personal injuries arose out of an acci·
dent that occurred June 25, 1969, during the construction
of a high rise resident hall at Brigham Young University.
The defendant, a general contractor, was awarded a
contract with Brigham Young University for the con·
struction of "Deseret Towers Resident Hall V." There·
after the defendant entered into a subcontract on Decem·
her 30, 1968, with Ashton Construction Company for the
masonry work. The plaintiff, age 49, was employed by
Ashton Construction as a mason on the above job. He had
worked as a mason since 1951 and for Ashton Construe·
tion since 1962 (Plaintiff's deposition at 4).
He was the first bricklayer on the job. Id at 7.
Once the exterior walls of the resident hall were
completed the plaintiff began constructing interior par·
tition walls on each floor of the building.
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On the morning of June 25, 1969 the plaintiff worked on the west end of the sixth floor until about 10:00
a.m. Id. at 24.
He then went to the east end of the sixth floor and
began work on another interior partition wall. To complete the upper portion of the wall he used a 2 1/2 foot
high scaffolding parallel to and placed on the west side of
the interior partition wall. Id. at 28. The east side of the
wall was part of the interior of a dormitory room opposite which was an opening in the building's east exterior
wall in which a window was eventually to be placed. Id.
at 26. The window space was approximately 8 feet from
the north end of the scaffolding which extended through
the door space into the room. See diagram on page 4.
As the plaintiff completed the wall he picked up his
tools and jumped backwards off the scaffolding in the
direction of the window opening. His foot struck something and rolled with him. Id. at 29.
In an effort to regain his balance he backpedaled
some 8 to 1O feet and fell out the window to the ground
approximately 60 feet below. Id. at 39.
The plaintiff, starting at line 23, page 29, of his
deposition, described the accident:

"Q. You got the wall clear up to the ceiling when
the accident happened?
A. Yes.
Q.

You had laid the last block then?
3
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Plaintiff jumped off here,
backpedaled and fell out
here

A.

I had laid the last block. The last block you
lay, we had to split. We had to split it with
a saw and lay it in two pieces because of a
conduit that goes into the ceiling. We had no
way of getting the last block in without splitting the block. I had stepped down once off
the scaffold and I had looked up and seen
that the block, the last block that I laid, was
not in the proper position. So I stepped back
onto the scaffold and reset the block, and then
I stepped off the scaffold. I was going to
restrike, refinish the east side of the wall. I
had just stepped off the scaffold and stepped
on something that rolled with me. That is
when I went backpeddling out of the window.

Q.
A.

You stepped off the scaffold? Did you step
off an end or did you step off on the side?
I stepped off at the end through the door.

Q.

Stepped off the north end of it?

Q.

As you stepped off, did you step off backward or forward?
Backward.

A. The north end through the doorway.
A.
A.

I gather you weren't looking at the floor as
you stepped off?
I was not looking at the floor.

A.

You were looking up to see if the block that
you split was in the proper alignment at the
time you stepped off?
Not at the time I stepped off.

Q.

I see.

Q.

Q.

A. No, I was just stepping off. I was stepping
off preparatory to strike the east the east side of the wall.
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restriking

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.

How far down did you have to step now from
the scaffold to the floor?
Approximately two and a half feet.
And you say you stepped on something that
rolled? Which foot hit this object? The left
or your right?
That would be - I couldn't answer that
question.
And you say when you stepped on this you
started to kind of backpeddling?
I backpeddled.
Did you fall down in anyway before you
went through the window, or do you know?
No, I did not fall down. I was trying to catch
myself.
How far was it from the point where you
stepped down in feet to where this window
opening was?
Approximately eight feet.
Was this window open here the same as on
the floors below?
The same thing.
Had you requested at any time from your em·
ployer that there be any barricade on the win·
dows prior to working on these interior walls?

A.
Q.

No.
You had observed on the second floor that
there was no barricade on the window when
you put that one up?
A. There was no barricade on any window on
any floor.
Q. And you made no complaint about the ab·
sence of a barricade at any time?
6

A.

I had made no complaint. I didn't think that
was my job.

Q.

Well, you had observed the window,
[through], the aperture there at the time you
were working, had you not?
I was aware of the openings. I am not denying that."

A.

On page 42, line 8, Mr. Smith further describes how
the accident occurred.

" Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Now this round object that you were backpeddling on before you went out of the window, did you ever find that?
I never looked for it.
What is your judgment as to what type of a
piece of material this was?
It could have been a piece of two by four. It
could have been a fragment of block. It could
have been a fragment of brick. It could have
been a piece of conduit.

As far as you know it's just as possible one
as the other?
That is right.
Before working in this area you didn't ask
your employer to have the floor swept or
cleaned by any of the hod carriers?
The floors were pretty well cleaned.
From the time you started work until the time
you fell you were the only person working
right in this spot?
That is true."
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The defendant moved for summary judgment upon
the ground there was no genuine issue of fact (R. 64). In
oral argument and in a written memorandum to the lower
court defendant argued that summary judgment should
be granted because the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law which proximately
caused the injuries of which he complained. The lower
court and plaintiff's counsel were told all reasonable men
would argue plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence because he was aware of the window opening when
he jumped backward off the scaffold, he knew the window opening was only 8 feet to his rear and he admitted
stepping backward from the height of 2 1/2 feet, almost
half his own height, without looking at the floor knowing there was debris upon it (Deposition at 14, 29).
After the first hearing on September 25, 1970, the
lower court took the motion under advisement, asked
counsel to submit briefs, and told counsel that if it was
inclined to grant the defendant's motion for summary
judgment it would set the case for further oral argument
(R. 81). The lower court in accordance with this statement, on January 8, 1971, set the matter for further argument on the issues of causation and workmen's compensation (R. 75, 76).
Summary judgment was thereafter entered in favor
of the defendant on January 19, 1971 (R. 78).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I. AS A MATTER OF LAW PLAINTIFF WAS
GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
If there is no genuine issue of fact and all reasonable
men would agree the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence, the plaintiff cannot recover as a matter of law.

Since the plaintiff knew of the window opening behind him, knew it was 2 1/2 feet from his scaffold to the
floor and knew there was some debris in the area beneath
his scaffold, and was confronted with no situation preventing his looking before jumping or jumping forward,
the defendant submits that in jumping off the scaffold
with his back to the window opening without at least first
looking at the floor the plaintiff was negligent as a matter
of law.
The case of Whitman v. W. T. Grant Co., 60 Utah
2d 81, 395 P.2d 918 (1964) is right on point. In Whitman the plaintiff, a truck driver, made a delivery of merchandise to the upper floor of the defendant's store and
was then directed to the downstairs and out the door.
Without looking he walked through a set of double doors
and stepped backwards into an elevator shaft. In affirming summary judgment for the defendant this court set
forth the principles governing such cases:
"The plaintiff is confronted with a basic
proposition that when there is a hazard which is
plainly visible, ordinarily one is charged with the
duty of seeing and avoiding it. And if he fails to
do so, it is concluded that he was negligent either
in failing to look, or in failing to heed what he
saw." 395 P.2d at 920
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The court also explained upon what conditions a
jury question will be found to exist in such cases:
"In order to justify holding that a jury question as to negligence exists, where injury has resulted from an observable hazard, it is essential
that there be something which could be regarded
as tending to distract the plaintiff's attention or to
prevent him from seeing the danger, thus providing some reasonable basis for a finding that even
though he exercised due care he could be excused
from seeing and avoiding it." Id.
In Knox v. Snow, 119 Utah 522, 229 P.2d 874

(1951), a customer went to a garage and fell into a grease
pit while he was looking up at some tires. He sought to
excuse his failure to observe the danger by stating he was
not looking. In affirming a directed verdict for the defendant this court said:
"Plaintiff seeks to justify his failure to observe the danger which was clearly visible because
his sole interest was in the tire on the rack; that
he didn't see the ladder or the pit because he wasn't
looking at the floor or wasn't watching where he
was stepping because his interest was centered
solely on the tire rack; and that if he was looking
he would probably have seen the protruding ladder
and pit. It thus becomes apparent that this is not
a case where plaintiff used reasonable care for his
own safety. A reasonable person makes some oh·
servations along the path he chooses to follow. In
this instance plaintiff was so intent on observing
the articles on the rack that he neglected to use the
care required of a prudent man traversing a shop
having hazards readily discernible, even to one
with impaired vision." 229 P.2d at 877
IO

In Wood v. Wood, 8 Utah 2d 279, 333 P.2d 630
(1959), the plaintiff entered a dark garage and proceeded along the right side of a car where she could not see.
She then turned and fell down a darkened stairwell. She
knew about the stairwell but stated that she had temporarily forgotten about it because she was preoccupied with
her granddaughter's wedding plans. In affirming the
lower court's directed verdict for the defendant this court
restated the finding that the plaintiff was negligent as a
matter of law for entering "heedlessly into the darkness
in an unknown area." 333 P.2d at 632
In Seo/field v. Sprouse-Reitz Co., 1 Utah 2d 218, 205
P.2d 396 (1953), the plaintiff, a candy salesman, called
upon the manager of the defendant's store in Elko, Nevada. The manager's officer was located on a platform in
the rear of the office. After having a conversation with the
manager plaintiff decided to go to his car and get his samples. Without looking, he reached for a nonexistent bannister, lost his balance, and fell over the side of the stairway. In affirming a directed verdict for the defendant

this court said:
"The present case presents an even more obvious situation for contributory negligence than in
the Knox case, for it does not require that we attribute to plaintiff knowledge of the particular
type of place. He had ample opportunity to observe and, as a reasonably prudent man, should
have looked to locate the handrail before he attempted to put his weight on it. The light was
sufficient, he knew that he was on a platform, and
althouv.h he may have been preoccupied with try-
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ing to make a sale, he must be held to take the
simple precaution of a quick glance to assure himself of safety as would a reasonably prudent man."
265 P.2d at 398.
See also Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah 289,
259 P.2d 297 (1953); Henry v. Washiki Club, Inc., 11
Utah 2d 138, 355 P.2d 973 (1960); Tempest v. Richardson, 5 Utah 2d 174, 299 P.2d 124 (1956).
By plaintiff's own admissions he was well aware of
the window opening on the sixth floor. He had worked
on all six floors and had often worked at heights presenting an element of danger. He admitted jumping backward off a scaffold almost half his height without first
taking even a precautionary glance to the floor to see if it
was safe to jump. Nothing necessitated he jump before
looking much less jump backwards. Indeed he chose to
jump from the scaffold in the only place where a potential
danger of which he was well aware existed.
POINT II. THE CONDUCT OF LEON C. SMITH
WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT.
Plaintiff's complaint alleges defendant was negligent
in only one particular: "defendant negligently and carelessly failed to cover a wall opening where the plaintiff
was working . . . (R. 3, paragraph 4)."
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that defendant was negligent in the manner alleged, plaintiff's
conduct was still the sole proximate cause of his injuries.
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This court has many times explained the importance
in distinguishing the stage from the actors. Probably the
leading case in this state on sole proximate cause is Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 1 Utah 2d 143, 263 P.2d
287 (1953):
"In applying the test of foreseeability to situations where a negligently created pre-existing
condition combines with a later act of negligence
causing an injury, the courts have drawn a clearcut distinction between two classes of cases. The
first situation is where one has negligently created
a dangerous condition . . . and a later actor observed, or circumstances are such that he could
not fail to observe, but negligently failed to avoid
it.

* * *

"In regard to the first situation it is held as a
matter of law that the later intervening act does
interrupt the natural sequence of events and cut
off the legal effect of the negligence of the initial
actor." 263 P.2d at 292.

In a later case, Velasquez v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
12 Utah 2d 379, 366 P.2d 989 (1961) this court applied
the Hillyard rules and held a bus driver who had observed
a negligently parked truck ahead of him to be the sole
proximate cause of a subsequent collision with the truck.
The court restated the test of proximate cause:
"[T]his is the test to be applied: did the
wrongful act, in a natural and continuous sequence
of events which might reasonably be expected to
follow, produce the injury. If so, it ca~ ~e said to
be a concurring proximate cause of the tnjuty even
though the later negligent act of another . . . co-
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operated to cause it. On the other hand, if the latter's act of negligence in causing the collision was
of such character as not reasonably to be expected
to happen in the natural sequence of events, then
such later act of negligence is the independent, intervening cause and therefore the sole proximate
cause of the injury." 366 P.2d at 992
In Toma v. Utah Power & Light Co., 12 Utah 2d
278, 365 P.2d 788 (1961), the court held the negligence
of a construction company employer in continuing work
in the vicinity of high tension wires without taking steps
to have them de-energized was the sole proximate cause
of the deceased's death from electrocution when a crane
came into contact with a wire. The evidence showed that
the construction company knew of the hazard four days
prior to the accident. This court said, after examining the
facts, that because the construction company knew of the
hot wire involved, its later negligence was an independent intervening act of negligence and the sole proximate
cause of the accident in question.

This same principle of the foregoing cases has been
applied in more recent decisions of this court. See for example, Anderson v. Parson Red-E-Mix Co., 24 Utah 2d
128, 467 P.2d 45 (1970) involving a collision between a
car and a cement truck chute, and Skollingsberg v. Brookover, 484 P.2d 1177 (Utah 1971), where plaintiff
was not allowed to recover for injuries to his leg in a
second fall subsequent to defendant's negligence which
caused the initial leg injury.
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Applying the foregoing principles to this situation it
is very clear that plaintiff's conduct was the sole proximate cause of his injuries:
Mr. Smith knew the window was to his rear; he knew
that certain debris was always on the floor at construction
sites, yet he still jumped backwards off a 2 1/2 foot scaffold in the direction of the window opening without making any advance check on his footing below.
There was nothing natural or continuous about the
absence of a covering over the window space that produced Mr. Smith's injury.
POINT III. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION IS
PLAINTIFF'S EXCLUSIVE REMEDY AGAINST THIS
DEFENDANT.
The Workmen's Compensation Act encompasses two
main objectives. The first is to assure that injured employees will have necessary medical and hospital care and
modest but certain compensation for their injuries with
resulting benefits to themselves and their families. The
second objective is to afford employees protection against
possible disastrous claims for injuries which otherwise
they may not be able to bear.
The definition of employer in the Utah Workmen's
Compensation Act is broad. It is designed to provide
workmen's compensation coverage to persons besides
those regularly on an employer's payroll. The definition
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of employer is found in Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42 (1953).
As far as the section is material it reads:
"Where any employer procures any work to
be done wholly or in part for him by a contractor
over whose work he retains supervision or control,
and such work is a part or process in the trade or
business of the employer, such contractor, and all
persons employed by him, and all subcontractors
under him, and all persons employed by any such
subcontractors, shall be deemed, within the meaning of this section, employees of such original
employer. Any person, firm or corporation engag·
ed in the performance of work as an independent
contractor shall be deemed an employer within the
meaning of this section. The term "independent
contractor," as herein used, is defined to be any
person, association or corporation engaged in the
performance of any work for another, who, while
so engaged, is independent of the employer in all
that pertains to the execution of the work, is not
subject to the rule or control of the employer, is
engaged only in the performance of a definite job
or piece of work, and is subordinate to the employer only in effecting a result in accordance with
the employer's design."
Paragraph 7 of plaintiff's complaint (R. 4) alleges:
"At the time of the plaintiff's injury, the de·
fondant had exclusive control and management of
the facilities where the plaintiff was working."
The subcontract agreement between defendant and
Ashton Construction Company required the latter to provide workmen's compensation insurance with the cost of
such insurance to be included in the $102,600 subcontract.
Utah Code Ann.§ 35-1-60 (1953) provides that workmen's compensation is an employee's exclusive remedy.
16

In this situation the defendant and Ashton Construction Company were cooperating on a single project.

Allowing the plaintiff to recover against this defendant in effect requires the defendant to pay twice for the
same injury: once under the workmen's compensation
coverage for which he has paid and the second time in a
civil action. As such, an employee injured under the circumstances secures the full benefits of the Workmen's
Compensation Act while not being bound by any of the
provisions which would reduce his recovery. One of the
major purposes of the Act therefore - to protect an employer from distrastrous claims - is thwarted.
In the recent case of Gallegos v. Stringham, 21 Utah
2d 139, 442 P.2d 31 (1968), Gibbons and Reed Company
had on its payroll as a truck driver, the plaintiff. The
company also hired the defendant Stringham and his
truck at a rate of $10 per hour. Stringham paid all the
expenses on his truck and was not listed on Gibbons and
Reed's payroll. Stringham took orders from Gibbons and
Reed's foreman as to when to speed his trips and when to
haul back up to the traxcavator and when to drive away.
He was not free to haul dirt in any manner other than
as he was told. On those facts this court held as a matter
of law Stringham was in the same employment as Gallegos
even though not on the payroll and workmen's compensation thus was held to be plaintiff's exclusive remedy.
In Whitaker v. Douglas, 179 Kan. 64, 292 P.2d 688
( 1956), an action was brought by a subcontractor's employee against a general contractor for injuries sustained
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when the employee was delivering a truckload of ready
mixed concrete. A ramp constructed by the general contractor collapsed causing the truck to upset. The Kansas
Workmen's Compensation Act is similar to Utah's and
provided where the work subcontracted was part of the
contractor's trade and business that workmen's compensation was the exclusive remedy. The court, in pointing
out to the plaintiff that workmen's compensation was his
exclusive remedy, stated that the transporting of the cement for the construction of the building was part of the
trade and business of the general contractor and that, although the wages for the driver were paid by Victory
Sand & Gravel Company, he was helping in construction
of work to the same extent as if he had been on the direct
payroll of a general contractor.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
Plaintiff is 5 feet 7 inches tall. In jumping backwards off the scaffolding (almost half his height) without
taking even the slightest glance at his footing below he
was negligent as a matter of law.
The window opening through which plaintiff fell
was a condition of which plaintiff was well aware. His
negligence in intentionally jumping backwards towards
that opening was the sole proximate cause of his injuries.
If there was any negligence on the part of defendant in
not covering that opening it constituted a condition and
not a cause of plaintiff's injuries.
18

Plaintiff is further barred by the workmen's compensation law from suing this defendant. This defendant has
already paid for the workmen's compensation coverage
providing benefits for plaintiff's accident. Allowing an
additional suit would require this defendant to pay twice
for the same injury in contravention to the expressed public policy of the workmen's compensation laws.
Respectfully submitted,
Raymond M. Berry of
WORSLEY, SNOW &
CHRISTENSEN
7th Floor Continental Bank
Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Respondent
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